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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LANE SWAINSTON, LORI 
SWAINSTON, and LANE 
SWAINSTON as guardian ad 
litem for ZACHARY SWAINSTON, 
a minor, 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents , 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, 
INC., et al., 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the Order of the District Court 
denying a motion to disqualify plaintiffs1 counsel. This Court 
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(i) (1987). 
Appellant has designated this case being in category 14b 
for priority of oral argument, which category applies to 
11
 [a]ppeals from final orders in civil cases not included within 
other categories." (Amendment to Order Re: Priority of Cases 
Scheduled for Oral Argument, Utah Supreme Court, April 23, 
1987.) Respondents submit, however, that this case should be 
assigned the priority of category 10, which includes "[a]ppeals 
from interlocutory orders." 
Case No. 8703x2 is an appeal from an interlocutory order. 
(R. 606.) Although Case No. 870319 purports to be an appeal 
from a Rule 54(b) final order, IHC acknowledges that it is 
questionable whether an order denying a motion to disqualify can 
be declared final under Rule 54(b). (R. 364-65; Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Risiord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981).) This case 
should, therefore, be accorded priority for oral argument in 
accordance with category 10. 
Case Nos. 870312 & 870319 
(Consolidated) 
Category 101 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is a party who has had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate a disqualification motion in one court thereafter 
entitled to relitigate an identical motion in another court? 
2. Where an attorney has simultaneously represented the 
interests of adverse parties in separate matters, is his former 
law firm per se required to withdraw from both cases, not-
withstanding the attorney's lack of access to any confidential 
information and notwithstanding other facts which indicate that 
disqualification may not be warranted? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case* At issue in this appeal is a 
motion to disqualify plaintiffs' Counsel for alleged violations 
of the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility. The issue 
arises in a medical malpractice action. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plain-
tiffs filed their action for medical malpractice against 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. ("IHC"), and the defendant 
treating physician on March 9, 1984. (R. 1-6.) IHC filed a 
motion to disqualify plaintiffs' attorneys, Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen ("the Howard firm"), on February 27, 1986. (R. 170.) 
Supporting and opposing memoranda were filed (R. 94-169, 184-
216, 222-37) and an evidentiary hearing scheduled (R. 219), but 
the parties agreed that a hearing on the motion could be 
continued without date. (R. 220, 221.) An evidentiary hearing 
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was subsequently held in connection with an identical motion 
which had been filed by IHC against the Howard firm in a case 
then pending before the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah. After a full hearing on the merits, the court 
in that case denied IHC's motion. Bodily v. Intermountain 
Health Care. Inc. , 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986). IHC then 
determined to reactivate its motion in the instant case, and the 
parties stipulated that the motion could be decided based upon 
the evidence which had been taken before the federal court. (R. 
250-52.) New supporting and opposing memoranda were submitted 
(R. 255-301, 302-15, 320-31), and oral arguments were enter-
tained (R. 335). The district court, the Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen, thereafter entered its Ruling holding that IHC was 
collaterally estopped by reason of the prior federal adjudica-
tion from relitigating its disqualification motion before the 
state court. (R. 336-41.) 
The district court certified its order as final pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). (R. 341.) IHC perfected both a direct 
appeal from the final order (R. 3 64-65) and also petitioned this 
Court for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. (R. 608-13.) 
The petition was granted (R. 606) , and the appeals are now 
consolidated. 
C. Statement of Facts. Plaintiffs filed their complaint 
for medical malpractice against IHC and the treating physician 
on March 9, 1984. Plaintiffs were represented in the filing of 
that complaint by the Provo law firm of Abbott & Jensen. (R. 1-
3 
6.) Approximately three months after filing the Complaint, 
however, Abbott & Jensen filed their Notice of Withdrawal (R. 
34) , and the firm of Howard, Lewis & Petersen entered its 
appearance on June 25, 1984. (R. 39.) 
The parties engaged in substantial discovery, including the 
taking of 10 depositions. (R. 367-76.) The last discovery 
activity reflected in the file prior to the motion to disqualify 
was a deposition which was scheduled to occur on May 10, 1985. 
(R. 91.) 
Approximately one month later, the case of Wilson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Civil No. 69,908 (filed June 
14, 1985), was commenced in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. IHC was represented in Wilson by the Beverly 
Hills, California, office of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, 
Underberg, Manley & Casey ("Finley Kumble11). (R. 111.) On July 
11, 1985, Peter C. Rosenbloom, an associate with Finley Kumble, 
telephoned Richard B. Johnson, who was then a member of the 
Howard firm, with the purpose of engaging local counsel to 
assist Finley Kumble in conforming documents with the local 
rules of the court, making contact with other local counsel to 
arrange extensions of time to file documents or discovery 
responses, if necessary, and to perform other functions typical 
of local counsel. The substantive work in the case was to be 
performed by Finley Kumble. (R. 385.) 
Mr. Johnson testified that he advised Mr. Rosenbloom that 
the Howard firm engaged in a substantial amount of malpractice 
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litigation against IHC, and asked whether that would be a 
problem. Mr. Rosenbloom responded that he did not think the 
concurrent prosecution of malpractice actions against IHC would 
be a problem because the Wilson case was for wrongful discharge, 
but stated that he would clear it with his client and his senior 
partner and send materials to Mr. Johnson only if the repre-
sentation had been approved. (R. 172-73, 428-29, 456-57.) Mr. 
Rosenbloom further represented that he thought that the case 
would be resolved quickly by a motion to dismiss. (R. 429.) 
(Mr. Rosenbloom disputed having been advised that the Howard 
firm represented plaintiffs in malpractice actions against IHC. 
(R. 385.)) Mr. Rosenbloom further instructed Mr. Johnson to 
open a file for the case under the name of Peter Rosenbloom, and 
to send billings directly to him. (R. 429-30.) 
Mr. Rosenbloom subsequently sent a packet of materials to 
Mr. Johnson, from which Mr. Johnson assumed that Mr. 
Rosenbloom1s client, IHC, had agreed to the representation. (R. 
173, 205-06, 456-57.) During the next several months, Mr. 
Johnson prepared appropriate papers to secure the admittance pro 
hac vice of three members of the Finley Kumble firm (R. 207-13), 
and reviewed a motion to dismiss and supporting memoranda for 
compliance with Utah law and local procedure and had the papers 
retyped in proper form. (R. 186-88.) Mr. Johnson also prepared 
a notice of deposition, after the date and time for the deposi-
tion had been arranged by Finley Kumble and Wilson's attorneys. 
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(R. 187.) For these services Mr. Rosenbloom was billed $127.50 
in fees plus $68.32 for costs. (R. 176.) 
Mr. Johnson's only communications from Finley Kumble 
consisted of the initial telephone call, the complaint, a motion 
to dismiss and supporting memorandum, a reply memorandum, 
telephone calls regarding scheduling a deposition, various cover 
letters, and copies of letters from Mr. Rosenbloom to Wilson's 
attorneys. (R. 173-75.) Mr. Johnson specifically did not 
receive any literature, pamphlets, books or other information 
relative to IHC or its practices, policies, or conduct. (R. 
176.) No other member of the Howard firm had any involvement 
with or knowledge of the existence of the case. (R. 182.) 
Neither Mr. Johnson nor any member of the Howard firm had any 
direct contact with anyone from IHC regarding that case. Mr. 
Johnson did not even discuss the merits of the case with Mr. 
Rosenbloom, but discussed only the mechanics of scheduling 
depositions and conforming pleadings to local format. (R. 176.) 
About mid-November, 1985, Mr. Johnson first became aware 
that IHC had not consented to the representation. (R. 438.) 
Mr. Johnson immediately ceased all work on the case, and filed a 
Notice of Withdrawal on behalf of the Howard firm on January 16, 
1986. (R. 439.)2 
IHC filed its Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Counsel on 
February 27, 1986. (R. 170.) No other activity reflected in the 
2Mr. Johnson is no longer a member of the Howard firm. He 
left the firm on April 1, 1986. (R. 426.) 
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file had occurred in the instant case during the period that Mr. 
Johnson had appeared as counsel in Wilson. IHC's motion was 
ultimately denied by the trial court and IHC thereafter per-
fected this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly held that IHC was collaterally 
estopped from relitigating the issues raised by its motion to 
disqualify plaintiffs1 counsel. The same issues were fully and 
fairly litigated in Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp.. 
649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986) , and a decision adverse to IHC 
had been rendered. Bodily was decided under federal law, but 
federal law and state law on this issue are substantially 
identical. Although the decision in Bodily was not final for 
purposes of appeal, the decision did have that decree of 
finality necessary to warrant application of collateral estop-
pel. 
If this Court determines that the standards applied in 
Bodily were not in accord with Utah disqualification law, then 
respondents acknowledge that the trial court erred in applying 
collateral estoppel. The result reached, however, was still 
correct and should be affirmed. This Court's decision in 
Marqulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), did not 
establish a per se requirement of disqualification any time an 
attorney has simultaneously represented the interests of adverse 
parties in separate matters. The instant case is distinguish-
able from Marqulies in several respects, including particularly 
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the very limited nature of the representation, the undisputed 
lack of any actual access to confidential information or of any 
attempt to obtain confidential information, and the absence of 
any prejudice to IHC. Under the unique facts of this case, the 
extreme sanction of disqualification is not warranted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT 
IHC WAS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM 
RELITIGATING IN THIS CASE THE SAME ISSUE 
WHICH WAS DECIDED IN BODILY. 
The trial court held that IHC was collaterally estopped 
from relitigating its motion to disqualify in the instant case, 
because a motion to disqualify based on the same factual 
circumstances had been previously litigated and denied in Bodily 
v. Intermountain Health Care Corp. , 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 
1986). IHC challenges that ruling on two primary grounds, (1) 
that the issues in the two cases were not the same, and (2) that 
the Bodily decision was not a final judgment. These arguments 
will be addressed in order. 
A. The Issue in the Instant Case is Substantially 
Identical to the Issue in Bodily. 
IHC argues that the issue presented in Bodily was whether 
disqualification was required under federal law, whereas the 
issue in the instant case is whether disqualification was 
required under state law. Although this statement is techni-
cally correct, it does not follow that there was a lack of 
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identity of issues, because state and federal law in Utah are 
substantially the same with respect to disqualification. Where 
state and federal law are the same, collateral estoppel may be 
applied even though the technical labels on the issues are 
different. See Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Board, 20 Cal. 3d 881, 
143 Cal. Rptr. 692, 574 P.2d 763, cert, denied, 439 U.S. 872 
(1978) . 
A careful study of state and federal law as they relate to 
the instant case reveal that the law applied by Judge Greene in 
Bodily was substantially the same as that which would have been 
applied by Judge Christensen in the instant case. Judge Greene 
stated that this Court's "construction of Utah's version of the 
Code [of Professional Responsibility] is relevant and persua-
sive," 649 F. Supp. at 473 n.6, and relied heavily on Margulies 
v. Upchurch, 696 P. 2d 1195 (Utah 1985), in formulating his 
decision. Maraulies in turn relied heavily on federal prece-
dent. Maraulies particularly relied upon federal precedent in 
articulating the standard which IHC claims is controlling in 
this case. In support for its statement that an attorney should 
not be able to avoid a violation of Cannon 5 "by simply dropping 
one of the clients at his option when a disqualification motion 
is filed," this Court cited two federal cases, Unified Sewerage 
Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981), 
and Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 
84, 95 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977). 696 P.2d at 1203. 
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IHC claims that with respect to the issue of what' sanction 
to impose, Judge Greene relied wholly on federal cases. (Appel-
lant's Brief at p. 9.) Although it is true that Judge Greene 
cites predominately federal cases in Section III of his opinion, 
the cases there cited are not contrary to Utah law. For 
example, both Bodily and Marcrulies cite the same case, Redd v. 
Shell Oil Co. , 518 F.2d 311, 314 (10th Cir. 1975), to support 
the proposition that disqualification is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. 649 F. Supp. at 477; 696 P.2d at 
1199. The remaining federal cases cited in section III of 
Bodily are cited for the proposition that courts should be 
hesitant to separate a client from his chosen attorney, and 
should not do so unless the misconduct threatens to taint the 
litigation. This proposition is in accord with the statements 
in Marcrulies that disqualification motions are frequently used 
as a litigation tactic, 696 P.2d at 1201, and that disqualifica-
tion motions present the need to balance the client's right to 
chose his own attorney against the public's perception of 
integrity. 696 P.2d at 1204. 
More importantly, Judge Greene cites only Margulies in that 
portion of his opinion which actually analyzes the facts in 
Bodily to determine whether disqualification was appropriate in 
that case. 649 F. Supp. at 478 n.21. The trial court properly 
held that the standards applied in Bodilv were the same as those 
articulated in Margulies, and that Bodily decided the same issue 
as that presented in the instant case. 
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B. The Ruling in Bodily Was Sufficiently Final and Firm to 
Be Accorded Conclusive Effect. 
The purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to 
"prevent the relitigation of issues which a party has once 
actually litigated." Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 635 
P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981). IHC asserts, however, that col-
lateral estoppel does not apply, even if a party has fully 
litigated an issue, unless the litigation has resulted in a 
final judgment, and further asserts that finality is determined 
by the same standard as for appealability. In support of this 
proposition, IHC cites Gresham Park Community Organization v. 
Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1242 (5th Cir. 1981), and IB Moore's 
Federal Practice, pp. 744-47 (2nd ed. 1984) . Contrary to the 
assertion by IHC, the court in Gresham only held that the appeal 
standards of finality apply in a res judicata case. 652 F.2d at 
1242. 
A growing number of courts hold that the test of finality 
for collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is different from 
that used for res judicata or claim preclusion. This rule is 
expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1980): 
The rules of res judicata are applicable 
only when a final judgment is rendered. 
However, for purposes of issue preclusion 
(as distinguished from merger and bar), 
"final judgment" includes any prior ad-
judication of an issue in another action 
that is determined to be sufficiently firm 
to be accorded conclusive effect. 
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Comment g to that section states that the factors which 
should be considered are whether the prior decision was ade-
quately deliberated and firm, whether the parties were fully 
heard, and whether the court supported its decision with a 
reasoned opinion. The Restatement is based on the seminal case 
of Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.. 297 F.2d 80 (2d 
Cir. 1961), cert, denied. 368 U.S. 986 (1962), and its progeny. 
The court in Lummus stated as follows: 
Whether a judgment, not "final" in the sense 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, ought nevertheless be 
considered "final" in the sense of preclud-
ing further litigation of the same issue, 
turns upon such factors as the nature of the 
decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly 
tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and 
the opportunity for review. "Finality" in 
the context here relevant may mean little 
more than the litigation of a particular 
issue has reached such a stage that a court 
sees no really good reason for permitting it 
to be litigated again. 
297 F.2d at 89. 
Judge Greene1s decision in Bodily clearly meets these 
standards. The parties had a full and fair opportunity to be 
heard, and presented extensive evidence and arguments. The 
judgment was not tentative, and in fact, Judge Greene stated 
that it was a "final" decision. Although the decision was not 
immediately appealable and remains technically subject to 
revision under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), it is clear that it is 
sufficiently firm so as to warrant giving that decision preclu-
sive effect. 
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Judge Christensen properly held that IHC had already had a 
full and fair opportunity to issue the question of whether the 
Howard firm should be disqualified, and that they should not be 
given another opportunity to relitigate that same issue. That 
decision should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
DISQUALIFICATION IS NOT APPROPRIATE UNDER 
THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Point I of this brief establishes that the trial court 
properly held that IHC was precluded from relitigating in this 
case the same issues which had been previously litigated in 
Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. 
Utah 1986) . Even if this Court were to determine that col-
lateral estoppel or issue preclusion does not apply in this 
case, however, this Court should still affirm the decision of 
the trial court because it is apparent that the court reached a 
correct result. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 
267, 276 (Utah 1982). Because this case was submitted on 
stipulated facts, this Court may examine the facts de novo. 
Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Co. , 
748 P.2d 1058, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 11 (1987) (citing Prince v. 
W. Empire Life Insurance Co., 19 Utah 2d 174, 177, 428 P.2d 163, 
165 (1967)). 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen acknowledges that Richard Johnson, 
who at the time was a member of the Howard firm, entered an 
appearance in the case of Wilson v. Intermountain Heath Care, 
13 
Inc, as local counsel for IHC, and the Howard firm was at the 
same time counsel of record for plaintiffs in the instant 
action. IHC asserts that this conduct violated Canon 5 of the 
Utah Code of Professional Responsibility, and particularly DR 5-
105, which provides in part as follows: 
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple 
employment if the exercise of his indepen-
dent professional judgment in behalf of a 
client will be or is likely to be adversely 
affected by his representation of another 
client, or if it would be likely to involve 
him in representing differing interests, 
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-
105(C)* 
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-
105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent 
multiple clients if it is obvious that he 
can adequately represent the interest of 
each and if each consents to the representa-
tion after full disclosure of the possible 
effect of such representation on the 
exercise of his independent professional 
judgment on behalf of each. 
This rule proscribes multiple representation only in those 
instances where the lawyer's independent professional judgment 
will be affected thereby. The decision of whether disqualifica-
tion is warranted by reason of a technical violation of Canon 5 
should, therefore, involve a consideration of the degree to 
which the lawyer was called upon to exercise independent 
professional judgment on behalf of the client. Mr. Johnson's 
involvement in the Wilson case was limited solely to the 
clerical acts of conforming the documents to the format required 
by the local rules, and making contact with local attorneys to 
arrange for needed extensions of time and to schedule discovery. 
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A similar situation was addressed by the court in Silver 
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp,, 518 F.2d 751 
(2d Cir. 1975). The court there stated as follows: 
Schreibers1 involvement was, at most, 
limited to brief, informal discussions on a 
procedural matter or research on a specific 
point of law. . . . In this respect we do 
not believe that there is any basis for 
distinguishing between partners and 
associates on the basis of title alone—both 
are members of the bar and are bound by the 
same Code of Professional Responsibility. 
[Citation.] But there is reason to 
differentiate for disqualification purposes 
between lawyers who became heavily involved 
in the facts of a particular matter and 
those who enter briefly on the periphery for 
a limited and specific purpose relating 
solely to legal questions. . . . Under the 
latter circumstances, the attorney's role 
cannot be considered "representation" . . . 
so as to require disqualification. Those 
cases and the cannons on which they are 
based are intended to protect the con-
fidences of former clients when an attorney 
has been in a position to learn them. To 
apply the remedy when there is no realistic 
chance that confidences were disclosed would 
go far beyond the purpose of those 
decisions. 
518 F.2d at 756-57 (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that Mr. Johnson and the Howard firm did 
not gain access to any confidential information3 by reason of 
3The issue of receipt of or access to confidential informa-
tion is generally raised in subsequent representation cases 
where a violation of Canon 4 is alleged. See cases cited in 
Margulies, 696 P.2d at 1202. Although the instant case involves 
concurrent representation and an alleged violation of Canon 5's 
du*cy of loyalty, however, the Howard firm's lack of any access 
to confidential information is still relevant. In Margulies, 
this Court found the law firm violated its duty of loyalty by 
affirmatively and vigorously seeking in one case to obtain 
confidential information from clients which it represented in 
another case. The determinative issue in a concurrent represen-
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their involvement in Wilson, IHC has repeatedly asserted that 
there was a technical access to confidential information, but 
the evidence undisputedly demonstrated that Mr, Johnson's only 
contact was with Peter Rosenbloom, and that he did not relate 
any substantial information to Mr. Johnson other than that 
contained in pleadings which ultimately became part of the 
public record. Neither Mr. Johnson or anyone at the Howard firm 
had any contact whatsoever with IHC or any of its employees 
relating to Wilson, and so there was no occasion on wphich any 
confidential information could have been conveyed. 
IHC claims, however, that Maraulies established a per se 
rule mandating disqualification any time there is a violation of 
Cannons 5 and 9.4 (Appellants1 Brief at pp. 8-9.) Maraulies 
should not be read as establishing such a per se rule, and any 
inadvertent language to that effect in the opinion was not 
necessary to the holding and must be considered dictum. 
Maraulies presented a situation to this Court in which a 
law firm appeared as lead counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs in 
a medical malpractice action against certain doctors, and also 
appeared as lead counsel for a limited partnership composed of 
the same doctors in another action brought to foreclose personal 
tation case, therefore, is not whether there was some technical 
access to confidential information, but rather whether the law 
firm violated its Canon 5 duties by affirmatively seeking to 
compel disclosure of such confidential information. 
4
 The discussion herein has centered on Cannon 5 rather 
than on Cannon 9. It seems clear that any time there has been 
an impropriety (e.g., a violation of Cannon 5), there will also 
be an "appearance11 of impropriety. 
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letters of credit signed by the individual doctors. The 
malpractice action included a claim for punitive damages against 
the individual doctors, and the law firm had sought in the 
malpractice action to discover detailed information concerning 
the personal finances of the individual doctors. The doctors 
objected, and the court entered an order denying discovery of 
that information. That very financial information, however, was 
inherently already available to the law firm by reason of its 
representation of the limited partnership. 696 P.2d at 1199. 
This Court held that disqualification in Maraulies was 
mandated because of the serious appearance of impropriety 
resulting from the law firm's vigorous efforts to obtain 
confidential information from the firm's own clients over their 
objection. 
Respondents acknowledge that there is language in 
MarguLies, which language is quoted on pages 8 and 9 of 
Appellants' Brief, which, taken out of context and without 
reference to the facts of Margulies, might be read as establish-
ing a per se rule of disqualification. The cases cited in 
Margulies in support of those statements do not, however, 
support such a per se rule. In Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco 
Inc. , 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) and in Fund of Funds. Ltd. 
v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 225 (2nd Cir. 
1977), the courts denied the disqualification motions based on 
the unique circumstances presented in each of those cases. Even 
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the language in Marqulies, properly read in context, only 
establishes that disqualification was mandated under the 
circumstances of that case. 
The instant case is readily distinguishable from Marqulies 
on several important points. First, no one in the Howard firm 
had any actual contact or communication with IHC. Although the 
Howard firm acknowledges that it technically represented IHC, it 
would be more factually correct to state that the Howard firm 
represented Peter Rosenbloom, who in turn represented IHC. This 
is reflected both in the manner in which the billing was set up 
at Mr. Rosenbloom1 s request, and in the work which was per-
formed. 
Second, the Howard firm relied on an attorney to obtain the 
required consent from IHC. An important factor in this Court's 
decision in Marqulies was that the law firm had relied on a 
layman to obtain the necessary consents to the dual representa-
tions. The Court stated: 
Reliance upon a lay person is simply not 
sufficient to meet the standard of profes-
sional conduct. Sundstrom could not be 
supposed to understand the nuances of the 
ethical requirements of the situation and 
the alternatives available to the appellant. 
It does not even appear that he understood 
Jones, Waldo's dual representation to be 
possibly unethical. 
969 P.2d at 1204. 
In the instant case, in contrast, Mr. Johnson fully 
disclosed to Mr. Rosenbloom that the Howard firm had represented 
plaintiffs against IHC in the past and was representing them at 
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the time, and that the consent of IHC would be necessary for the 
Howard firm to represent IHC in the Wilson case. Rosenbloom 
replied that he did not see any problem with that, but that he 
would obtain the necessary consents. In contrast to a lay 
person, Rosenbloom as an attorney may be presumed to have 
understood the potential problems of the dual representation, 
and Rosenbloom in fact has testified that he was very familiar 
with those requirements. Under the circumstances, there was 
nothing inappropriate in Mr. Johnson's reliance on Mr. 
Rosenbloom to obtain the necessary consent from IHC. Although 
it appears in retrospect that it would have be preferable for 
Mr. Johnson to have confirmed that understanding by letter, the 
failure to do so does not change the fact that reliance on Mr. 
Rosenbloom to obtain the required consent was reasonable and 
proper under the circumstances. See Unified Sewerage, 646 F.2d 
at 1346 n.6. 
Third, the work performed by the Howard firm for IHC was 
more clerical than substantive. As set forth on page 15 above 
in the quote from the Silver Chrysler case, there is reason to 
distinguish for purposes of disqualification between an attorney 
who becomes heavily involved in the facts of the matter and 
those who perform more clerical tasks. Mr. Johnson did nothing 
more in the Wilson case than extend a professional courtesy to 
an out-of-state attorney to arrange for the admission of those 
out-of-state attorneys and to conform pleadings to local format. 
Although the Howard firm does not suggest that the practice 
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should be condoned, neither does it warrant the extreme sanction 
of disqualification. 
Finally, and most importantly, the Howard firm did not seek 
in any of the cases against IHC to obtain access to any docu-
ments which were inherently available to it as counsel in the 
Wilson case. The factor which appears to have been most 
important in compelling disqualification in Marcrulies was that 
the law firm had sought in the malpractice action to obtain 
confidential information to which it had access in the fore-
closure action. It was this attempt to obtain financial 
information which led to the filing of the motion to disqualify 
in the first instance. 596 P.2d at 1199. No such circumstance 
exists in this case. 
Margulies did not establish a per se rule of disqualifica-
tion. Each case must be judged on its own unique facts and 
circumstances. The serious improprieties and active attempt to 
obtain confidential information which were present in Margulies 
are not present in the instant case. Mr. Johnson was not 
involved in the substantive aspects of the representation, and 
his only contact was with an attorney who in turn represented 
IHC. Subjecting the plaintiffs to the delay and expense inherit 
in disqualification is not justified by the minor nature of any 
violation which may have occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly applied collateral estoppel to 
deny IHCfs Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs1 Attorneys, because 
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state and federal law on the relevant issues were the same, and 
the decision in Bodily was sufficiently firm to be accorded 
conclusive effect, 
Maraulies does not establish a per se rule of disqualifica-
tion. A review of the facts and circumstances of this case 
establish that any violation which may have occurred was 
relatively minor, and does not warrant subjecting the plaintiffs 
to the extreme sanction of denying them the right to use the 
counsel of their choice and imposing on them the delay and 
expense associated with obtaining new counsel. 
The ruling of the trial court, denying IHC's Motion to 
Disqualify Plaintiffs1 Attorneys, should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of Februarys 1988. 
. "iSwi, fcjk SNN C. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen (Respondent) 
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